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Emily Dickinson’s Funeral and the Paradox of Literary Fame 
 Emily Dickinson’s careful orchestration of her own April 19, 1886, funeral transformed 
that event into a concluding artistic gesture, a final elegiac poem, that has much to tell us about 
her understanding of literary fame. Her previous statements regarding fame tell us that language 
powerful enough to achieve immortality did so by entering a life independent of the author, and 
that she—like many other nineteenth-century writers—preferred to risk obscurity rather than 
tether her writing to her name and the attendant historical specificity of her biography. In the 
context of this attitude toward fame, one that so clearly reinforces her well-known aversion to 
public displays of any sort, Dickinson’s decision to include Emily Brontë’s poem “No coward 
soul is mine” as the centerpiece of a decidedly unconventional funeral seems at first glance to be 
a surprising reversal of position. By attaching Brontë’s name to her own, and in effect saying to 
the world that Brontë’s words have found new life in her,1 Dickinson appears to have used her 
own last poem—her funeral—to expand Brontë’s fame, while also drawing attention to the 
artistic conversation they shared.2 Despite this apparent contradiction, however, Dickinson’s 
posthumous appropriation of Brontë’s poem ultimately proves consistent with an approach to 
literary fame Dickinson expressed in certain key letters and poems, most particularly the poem 
“To earn it by disdaining it” (Fr1445) in which the speaker initially proclaims that “Fame’s 
consummate fee” is the poet’s decision not to pursue it. This poem, and others like it, 
collectively argue that the kind of literary celebrity worthy of aspiration illuminates, ironicallly, 
the lives of those who court immortality by escaping the allure of momentary fashion and instead 
dedicate their creative lives to timeless art outside the public eye. The Brontë poem’s reference 
to “The steadfast rock of humanity” (l.16) is particularly intriguing in this regard because its 
metaphoric association of rock with timeless fame would have resonated with developments in 
geological science and linguistic theory familiar to Dickinson that also link fame to processes 
that escape notice in the present. As an examination of her funeral reveals, Dickinson used this 
final, posthumous artistic gesture to respect the “consummate fee” exacted by fame while 
simultaneously announcing her bid for immortality and explaining how the life she led prepared 
her for it.3  
 Dickinson’s poems exploring fame and the experience of literary immortality leave little 
doubt that she thought deeply about how important the proper management of the artist’s life 
was to the creation of enduring art. The poem “To earn it by disdaining it” is of particular 
importance because it represents one of the clearest and most central of all the poetic directives 
Dickinson delivers to aspiring artists, including herself. When that speaker admonishes the 
aspirant to fame by stating that “Fame’s consummate fee” is the disdain of fame, and declares in 
the next breath that “He loves what spurns him –” (ll. 2-3), Dickinson gives voice to a primary 
tension that ripples throughout her entire corpus wherever the question of enduring literary or 
artistic influence surfaces. For this reason, it comes as no surprise that the Dickinson pantheon of 
inspirational artists should include the category of “Martyr Poets” (Fr665) who “did not tell” but 
rather “wrought their Pang in syllable – / That when their mortal name be numb – / Their mortal 
fate – encourage Some –” (ll. 1-4). As Leo Braudy has noted in The Frenzy of Renown: Fame 
and Its History, these Dickinson poems contribute directly to a “paradox” that “winds its way 
through the [nineteenth] century” (464) and may be observed in the work of writers such as 
Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman (468) “for whom the badge of true success was public neglect, 
because each served ideals higher than the satisfaction of the multitude” (463). Writing 
specifically about Dickinson’s poem “The Martyr Poets,” Braudy draws attention to “the silence 
of the artist that assures the reverberation of the work” (469). Dickinson’s speaker in “Fame is 
the one that does not stay –” (Fr1507)  also associates fame with silence by noting, “It’s [sic] 
occupant must die / Or out of sight of estimate / Ascend incessantly –” (ll.1-4). The speaker in 
yet another poem abruptly declares, “I’m Nobody!” and immediately asks, “Who are You?” 
(Fr260), similarly advocating nameless obscurity as a means of reaching an audience that truly 
matters. The poem “Fame of Myself, to justify” (Fr481) insists that such an audience must begin 
with the poet herself: “Fame of Myself to lack – Although / My Name be else supreme –,” this 
artist/speaker seemingly reminds herself, “were an Honor honorless – / A futile Diadem” (ll. 5-
8). True poets disdain approbation rooted in the transient fashion of the present and withhold 
their names for future readers.   
 To a large extent, Dickinson’s approach to fame accurately reflects the widely accepted 
understanding of fame that Braudy attributes to nineteenth-century American letters in general. 
According to Braudy, American writers such as Dickinson tended to be “more interested in the 
spirit beyond history” than in immediate acclaim; were dedicated to the belief that “true 
enterprise [is] posthumous, whether one is successful in his own time or not”; and shared the 
conviction that “No earthly hierarchy, beholding to time, can compensate for the rewards of the 
spirit” (468).  These noble values are often inversely expressed by prominent authors who either 
falter themselves and fall victim to the lure of fashion, express fear of yielding, or castigate those 
whose fame they interpret as the betrayal of their own artistic ideals. Edgar Allan Poe famously 
satirized the corrupt but popular man of letters in his sketch “The Literati of New York City” 
when he declares that “in a republic such as ours, the mere man of letters must ever be a cipher” 
whose highest ambition is to become “the man of fashion or society” (196). David Haven Blake 
cites as representative the example of one popular speaker who reduced the word “fame” to an 
acronym for “’$50 and my expenses’” (36). Braudy points out that even at the “height of his 
fame” Emerson “still published some poetry and essays anonymously, as if to keep alive in 
himself the sense of a literary nature unspoiled by the public gaze” (464). Nathaniel Hawthorne 
is well known for designing the character Priscilla in The Blithedale Romance as an example of 
how celebrity might enslave the unwary or vulnerable (Blake 40). Whitman, who openly sought 
the embrace of the crowd, also agonized over the seductive power of public adulation. The 
poet/speaker of “Bardic Symbols” admits to having betrayed his true self: “Aware now,” he 
confesses, “that, amid the blab whose echoes recoil upon me, / I have not once had the least idea 
who or what I am,” he at last bends under the weight of his own regret and “fall[s] helpless upon 
the sand” (Atlantic Monthly 1860). Blake concludes that with these words Whitman’s speaker 
belatedly “comes to know the emptiness and superficiality of hype” (162). What may most 
distinguish Dickinson’s writing on fame and set her apart from these writers is her close focus on 
the proper conduct of the artist who devotes her life to immortality and thereby exalts fame while 
steadfastly resisting the allure posed by popular approval.  
 How, then, does Dickinson incorporate this pattern of conduct in the planning of her 
funeral, and how does her inclusion of Brontë’s poem fit into a theory of literary fame consistent 
with her writing on the subject? Answering this question begins with the willingness to read 
Dickinson’s funeral as a self-elegy that celebrates the poet’s achievement after she has passed 
out of this life and is no longer vulnerable to the limiting influence of momentary trends. Barton 
Levi St. Armand provides initial impetus for such a reading when he states that the funeral does 
indeed function as “Dickinson’s last poem,” one so carefully structured that “[e]very detail of the 
ritual had as many allegorical resonances as did the emblems in a Rosetti painting” (74). Mable 
Loomis Todd, who attended the funeral, lends credence to St. Armand’s observation when she 
writes that the “’The funeral—if so ghastly a name could apply to anything so poetical . . . was 
the most beautiful thing I ever saw’” (qtd. in Leyda, Days and Hours 474). The details St. 
Armand alludes to would certainly include Dickinson’s request that six Irish Catholic laborers 
employed by the Dickinson family serve as pallbearers who would carry her coffin from the back 
door of the Homestead through the open barn and from there to the cemetery by pathways rather 
than processing from the front door to the grave by means of city streets. Aife Murray has 
interpreted Dickinson’s specifications as creating a “choreographed” “death rite” (182) that 
broke with family tradition and shared important features with traditional Irish wakes, whereby 
the “most unused track to the burial ground . . . was meant to deceive the spirit of the dead” 
(199). Jay Leyda describes the funeral as a “pageant of alliances” (“Miss Emily’s Maggie” 266) 
that St. Armand later analyzes as including a deviation from Protestant tradition that 
“simultaneously defied public opinion and renounced the patriarchal house in which [Dickinson] 
had immured herself for over twenty years. . .” (76). More useful, even, for understanding the 
role Dickinson assigned Brontë is St. Armand’s observation that the funeral incorporated a 
“mixture of paganism and Christianity” as it climaxed with Thomas Wentworth Higginson’s 
reading of the Brontë poem.4 St. Armand describes the poem’s role this way: “Beginning with 
the declaration ‘No coward soul is mine,’ this romantic manifesto brashly addresses the ‘God 
within my breast’ and pantheistically concludes” with the following lines (76): 
 There is not room for Death, 
Nor atom that his might could render void; 
 Thou - THOU art Being and Breath, 
And what THOU art may never be destroyed.  (ll. 25-28) 
Thinking of the poem as a defiant utterance situated within an unconventional funeral that is in 
its own way defiant provides a logic for viewing Dickinson’s inclusion of Emily Brontë as an act 
of poetic collaboration by means of which Dickinson enlists her sister poet in a joint declaration 
of the power of art to challenge the authority of death.  
Unlike the standard funeral elegy, then, that offers consolation in the form of predictable 
language acknowledging the absence of the departed, Dickinson’s elegy seeks to thwart death. 
Cate L. Mahoney presents this resistance to elegiac closure as a central feature of Dickinson’s 
later poetic elegies, within which “[t]he elegy becomes . . . a device of departure that helps the 
elegist enact a search that does not end at all” (69). Alexandra Socarides similarly stipulates that 
Dickinson rejects “the narrative of consolation that elegy makes possible” (316). Writing 
specifically of “All overgrown by cunning moss” (Fr146), an elegiac poem intriguingly 
dedicated to Emily Brontë’s sister Charlotte, Socarides concludes that “the sense of consolation 
that most elegies aim to conjure depends heavily on conventions of closure” that Dickinson 
refuses. The idea that an elegy could provoke increased awareness of the deceased and even 
trigger a search for the absent yet present departed makes astonishing sense in the instance of 
Dickinson’s funeral, particularly in light of her request that Higginson read Emily Brontë’s poem 
as part of her funeral service (Moon 231). 
Virtually all the historical accounts agree that Higginson read the poem as part of the 
funeral service held at the Homestead where, according to Richard Sewall, Higginson began by 
explaining that this specific poem was appropriate because, in Higginson’s words, “’our friend 
who has just now put on Immortality, and who seemed scarce ever to have taken it off, used to 
read it to her sister’” (274). While it is valuable to note that this poem was known to be among 
Dickinson’s favorites, what is most striking in terms of the poem’s commentary on literary fame 
is Higginson’s riddling language of putting on and taking off immortality that to modern ears 
presents Dickinson as a famous poet who has just assumed immortality permanently through 
death, even though she had donned this very immortality previously as a discontinuous artistic 
practice throughout the course of her mortal life. Embedded in Higginson’s wordplay lies a chief 
conundrum of the Brontë poem and one of the keys to its role in Dickinson’s self-elegy. 
Higginson appears to understand that immortality was important to Dickinson, and that Brontë’s 
poem is an affirmation of immortality, but what he may not have understood is the extent to 
which the poem speaks directly to the poet’s continuous struggle to retain faith in the timeless 
power of her art. We of course see Dickinson as having triumphed over the doubts that attended 
her daily efforts, but neither she nor Higginson could have known this outcome at the time of the 
funeral. What might have therefore appealed most to Dickinson was the extraordinarily confident 
and even aggressive tone that Brontë immediately establishes in her first line where her speaker 
denies that her soul is in any sense cowardly.  
No coward soul is mine, 
No trembler in the world’s storm-troubled sphere: 
I see Heaven’s glories shine, 
And faith shines equal, arming me from fear. 
 
O God within my breast, 
Almighty, ever-present Deity! 
Life – that in me has rest, 
As I – undying Life – have power in thee! 
 
Vain are the thousand creeds 
That move men’s hearts: unutterably vain; 
Worthless as withered weeds, 
Or idlest froth amid the boundless main, 
 
To waken doubt in one 
Holding so fast by thine infinity; 
So surely anchored on 
The steadfast rock of immortality. 
 
With wide-embracing love 
Thy spirit animates eternal years, 
Pervades and broods above, 
Changes, sustains, dissolves, creates, and rears. 
 
Though earth and man were gone, 
And suns and universes ceased to be, 
And Thou were left alone, 
Every existence would exist in Thee. 
 
There is not room for Death, 
Nor atom that his might could render void: 
Thou – THOU art Being and Breath, 
And what THOU art may never be destroyed. 
Brontë’s bold opening declaration achieves its power precisely because it acknowledges the 
possibility of cowardice that places the question of cowardice forever in the foreground of the 
poem, as if to say that courage is only real when called for, tested, and proven. The tone, then, is 
insistently defiant in a manner that would resonate forcefully in the ears of another poet, so much 
so that the reader senses the speaker staring down death, almost desiring death to announce itself 
so she can overcome it and in doing so, affirm faith in the immortality of her art.  
Thus in the very next line of the poem the speaker states that she is “No trembler in the 
world’s storm-troubled sphere” and concludes the opening stanza as if she were a champion 
about to enter the lists: “And Faith shines equal arming me from fear.” This is indeed romantic 
but also highly unorthodox, and, as St. Armand has indicated, pantheistic. The full extent of 
Brontë’s disregard of Christian orthodoxy is made explicit at the midway point in the poem 
where her speaker boldly asserts, “Vain are the thousand creeds . . . . / To waken doubt in one . . . 
So surely anchored on / The steadfast rock of immortality” (ll. 9, 13, 15-16). 5 Here Brontë 
exposes the false comfort of creeds that presume to shield the soul from sources of doubt, 
choosing instead to situate immortality in “steadfast rock.” Her speaker calls forth the very 
doubts such creeds would conceal, for only by facing them can she revel in the naked joy of 
bringing them to heel. “There is not room for Death,” she almost tauntingly exults in the final 
stanza, “Nor atom that his might could render void” (ll. 25-26). This speaker now denies death to 
even the elemental atom, and she appears to delight in doing so. Such ferocity would have 
appealed to Dickinson, the poet who wrote, “Afraid! Of whom am I afraid? / Not Death – for 
who is He?” (Fr345).  
 Striking as Brontë’s boldness is in the opening, middle, and concluding portions of of her 
poem, she most explicitly flirts with the limits of artistic presumption in the second stanza, where 
her speaker affirms the crucial interdependence that binds her finite, mortal existence to the 
infinite life that flows through her.  This is where the speaker states that the “Almighty, ever-
present Deity! / Life . . . in me hast rest” (ll. 6-7) just “As,” or in exchange for which, she 
receives “power” in “undying Life” (l. 8).6 Brontë’s deity in effect dons mortal form by finding 
“rest” in the poet, opening her eyes to the wonders of creation described in stanzas five and six 
where Brontë gives special attention to the endless mutability of the spirit that “animates eternal 
years” and “Changes, sustains, dissolves, creates and rears // Though earth and man were gone / 
And suns and universes ceased to be” (ll. 18, 20-22). This last observation—that undying life 
“animates eternal years”—implies that the artist or poet who expresses the infinite in the present 
must by definition defy artistic convention through acts that announce life’s ceaseless 
mutations.7 Defiance, in other words, is a daily necessity. 
Generally read as Brontë’s assertion of the soul’s triumph over mortality, the poem 
affirms a personal power that Brontë scholar Janet Gezari links directly to artistic creation, 
stating that in the poem Brontë “manages to hold eternity firmly in view and to persuade herself 
that her own creative power is indomitable” (130).8  This is the view I think most congenial to 
Dickinson, who first encountered the poem in the 1850 edition of Wuthering Heights and Agnes 
Grey that also contained the first edition of Emily Bronte’s poems to be published after her death 
in 1848. The association of the poem with the very end of Emily Bronte’s life is further enhanced 
by its position in the volume—it is the last entry—where it is preceded by an introductory 
sentence written by the poet’s sister Charlotte, stating that “The following are the last lines my 
sister Emily ever wrote” (295). I join other scholars in imagining that Dickinson read Brontë’s 
poem as the earlier poet’s final pronouncement on the matter of literary fame. As Michael Moon 
has noted, Brontë’s poem communicates a current of stoic resolution in the face of death that 
both Brontë and Dickinson associate with the posthumous publication of their poems. “’No 
coward soul is mine,’” he writes, “may mark the first moment in Brontë’s career when she felt 
the harsh new conditions of susceptibility to such publication,” a susceptibility the poem “may 
have similarly marked for [Dickinson’s] survivors” when it was read as part of her funeral (241). 
I would go even further than Moon in urging the view that Dickinson’s choice of this poem 
represents the culmination of her developing ideas about the risks of posthumous publication.9  
Support for this claim comes from Dickinson’s third letter to Higginson and in poems 
such as “To earn it by disdaining it” (Fr1445) that present lasting fame as literary power that 
informs the language of the present but is not confined by transient artistic tastes or historical 
specificity. In her June 1862 letter to Higginson, Dickinson famously responds to his suggestion 
that she “delay ‘to publish’” by declaring, “If fame belonged to me, I could not escape her” 
(L408). When these words are combined with all four lines of the first stanza of “To earn it by 
disdaining it,” one discovers a blueprint of sorts for the achievement of fame.   
To earn it by disdaining it 
Is Fame’s consummate Fee – 
He loves what spurns him – 
Look behind – He is pursuing thee – 
Dickinson here reiterates the need to spurn fame as she did in her letter to Higginson while 
additionally pointing to the importance of the backward glance, the “Look behind” that detects 
and confirms the advance of fame. It is worth noting that fame is presented as moving forward in 
history as a force that advances through time by means of artists, such as the speaker, who serve 
as its vehicles; fame itself is nameless. The backward glance is particularly significant as it 
registers the need for verification predicated on risk and uncertainty at the same time that it 
magnifies the need to search history for evidence that fame is in pursuit. This is in effect what 
Dickinson asks us to do when she bonds her work to Brontë’s through her funeral service: she 
wants us to search her work for evidence of fame; in particular, evidence that she expands the 
fame attributed to Brontë. What this means is that Dickinson includes the poem of her 
predecessor first to establish the daily courage required of the poet who seeks immortality, and 
then to direct attention to her own literary record, where the search for evidence will demonstrate 
the achievement of immortality that she shares with Brontë. This latter objective is perhaps the 
most daring of all the defiant gestures Dickinson builds into her funeral.    
Covert references to the kinship that she felt with Brontë on questions of publication and 
fame are frequent in Dickinson’s work, one example of which would be the poem “How happy is 
the little Stone” and the letters accompanying its dissemination.  This poem’s particular history 
takes a revealing turn shortly after April 24, 1882, the day Thomas Niles, the editor at Roberts 
Brothers who oversaw Dickinson’s anonymous 1878 publication of the poem “Success is 
counted sweetest” in A Masque of Poets, wrote to Dickinson requesting that she send him “a 
volume of [her] poems.”10 Dickinson instead sent the single poem “How happy is the little 
Stone” (Fr1570E), the poem she refers to in the text of her letter as a “Pebble” (L726). Her use of 
lapidary terminology in this instance significantly echoes Brontë’s rock reference at the heart of 
“No coward soul is mine,” in which she grounds her faith in the “steadfast rock of immortality.”  
Dickinson sent other versions of her “Pebble” poem to Susan Dickinson, Helen Hunt Jackson, 
and Higginson, all correspondents with whom she discussed poetry and the possibility of print 
publication (FrFranklin 1372-75). [I stetted your original reference to Franklin and inserted a 
space]1372-75). Jackson, for one, urged Dickinson to seek print publication, and Niles cites 
Jackson as the basis for his own wish to assist with publication. Jackson, Niles writes to 
Dickinson, “once told me that she wished you could be induced to publish a volume of your 
poems” (L726). He then concludes his letter by stating, “I wish also that you could.” 
Given this context, it seems reasonable to read “How happy is the little Stone” as a 
commentary on Dickinson’s spurning of publication, especially given the powerful conceptual 
links between this “pebble” and Brontë’s “rock of immortality.” Brontë’s reference appears in 
the pivotal fourth stanza of her seven-stanza poem where it anchors the speaker’s dismissal of 
doubt: “Vain are the thousand creeds / That move men’s hearts . . . // To waken doubt in one . . . 
so surely anchored on / The steadfast rock of immortality” (ll. 9-10, 13, 15-16). The primary link 
uniting the two poems is the function of rock as a symbol for immortality that in Brontë’s case 
continues to exist even when “suns and universes ceased to be” (l. 22), whereas Dickinson’s 
stone “doesn’t care about Careers” and “never fears” the “Exigencies” of life (ll. 3-4). The most 
obvious connection to Brontë may, however, be Dickinson’s speaker’s declaration that “a 
passing universe put on” (l. 6) the stone’s “Coat of elemental Brown” (l. 5) after which the stone 
fulfills “absolute Degree / In casual simplicity” (ll. 9-10). If Dickinson’s simple Pebble is indeed 
the diminutive of Brontë’s more majestic rock, the clearest evidence of that connection is 
Dickinson’s adoption of her precursor’s primary symbol for her own courageous defiance of 
mortality. To be precise, both poets present art as an illumination of the infinite that escapes 
adherence to time-bound artistic conventions through fusion with the timeless universe. 
Dickinson’s metaphoric reference to a coat donned by a “passing Universe” might in this 
instance underscore the accuracy of Higginson’s funeral observation that Dickinson put on 
immortality every day, even though he may not have fully appreciated how she accomplished 
this through her poetry. The relationship Dickinson’s speaker enters into with the passing 
universe also, and most significantly, reflects the artistic reciprocity central to the Brontë poem. 
 Odd as it may seem to readers today, Dickinson’s appropriation of Brontë’s rock as a 
metaphor for timeless language that permeates the universe would not have struck her 
contemporaries as particularly strange or unusual. Edward Hitchcock, who was president of 
Amherst College when he published The Religion of Geology and Its Connected Sciences in 
1851, used geological science and mathematics to argue that all our words, actions, and thoughts 
“make an indelible impression on the universe” (331) that is, “perhaps, most frequent and 
striking in the rocks” (351). Hitchcock goes on to state that once humanity evolves to “a 
condition far more exalted than the present” (354), they will discern a record that reveals all 
secret sins while also illuminating “a golden chain” that links “every created being in heaven and 
earth” (353). Benjamin Lease has usefully identified Hitchcock as a “towering presence in 
Amherst and an important influence on Emily Dickinson” (121), and he might easily have gone 
on to state that Hitchcock made the impression he did because his study complemented 
observations by prominent Transcendentalists, such as Elizabeth Palmer Peabody, the last editor 
of The Dial and the thinker Philip F. Gura identifies as “the premier purveyor of language theory, 
both in its theoretical and practical aspects” (154).  In her 1849 volume, Aesthetic Papers, 
Peabody draws directly on the rock metaphor: “The human mind,” she writes, “is in relation to 
nature as the stone-cutter or the artist to the quarry; and language is at once the representation 
and vehicle of all that has been quarried” (216).  
An even stronger contemporary connection linking geology metaphorically to language, 
and poetry in particular, may be found in the theory of language propounded by Richard 
Chenevix Trench in his 1855 On the Study of Words, a work contained in the Dickinson family 
library. The student of language, like “the geologist,” Trench writes, “is able from the different 
strata and deposits . . . to measure the forces that were at work to produce” the English language 
(125). According to Trench, such geologic reading reveals that “God gave man language” (14) 
not as a developed vocabulary but instead as the ability to name, thereby making linguistic 
creation “at once divine and human” (15). It logically follows, then, that the responsibility for 
honoring the gift of language rests most heavily with the poet, the “maker” invested with the 
power of bringing into existence what Trench describes as “things which were not before and, 
which would not have existed but for him, or for some other gifted with equal powers” (6). The 
poet extends the vital life of language by clothing it in words appropriate to the never-before-
experienced historical present.  
 As Melanie Hubbard has made clear in her analysis of Trench’s influence on Dickinson, 
a central tenet of his work that would have special appeal to a poet is his “explicit” belief “that 
our relationship with language is reciprocal” (251). Reciprocity in this instance grows out of the 
power of language “to propagate and diffuse” while also granting immortality to those words that 
enter the stream of language and endure beyond the present. Such language, Trench notes, rises 
like “an ark riding above the water-floods that have swept away or submerged every other 
landmark and memorial of bygone ages and vanished generations of men. Far beyond all written 
records in a language, the language itself stretches back, and offers itself for our investigation” 
(124). So also does language stretch forward beyond the present, offering future readers a golden 
chain of sorts that links all past and future ages.  
Writing specifically of the need for language to express the “spiritual and infinite” in a 
manner appropriate to the demands of the historical present, Trench makes direct use of the 
language-as-clothing trope that surfaces in Dickinson’s reference to the pebble’s “Coat of 
elemental Brown”: “And thus it continually befel [sic], that the new thought must weave a new 
garment for itself, those which it found ready made being narrower than that it could wrap itself 
in . . . the old being neither strong enough, nor expansive enough to hold it” (194). In terms of 
Dickinson’s approach to fame, what stands out most in this context is the function of language as 
the vehicle that transfers what Elizabeth Peabody has referred to as the “fruits” or artistic insights 
of previous generations. These fruits, Peabody contends, “are conserved, or rather live and move, 
in language.”  Language, according to Peabody, is “a necessary product” that is “what it is, 
precisely because it could not be otherwise” (154). The poet, then, in her capacity as literary 
artist, contributes to the emergence of a universal language that unites the finite with the infinite. 
The fame Dickinson describes as “pursuing” the successful poet would in this case be the 
evidence of her contribution to such a universal language. To achieve this goal, however, is to 
forever pass from the present into the future where the poet, like Dickinson’s “little Stone,” finds 
happiness when it “rambles in the Road alone” (ll. 1, 2). Fame comes from providing the 
linguistic garment that best fits the moment, in exchange for which the poet’s language becomes 
immortal. 
 The bargain the artist strikes with the divine, whereby access to the infinite is granted 
through the denial of momentary renown, is a central concern of Dickinson’s poem “Of all the 
Souls that stand create –” (Fr279), a poem she probably composed twenty years before she wrote 
her defiant letter to Niles and twelve years after first reading “No coward soul is mine.” As was 
the case with the pebble poem, this one also makes sense as a poetic collaboration with Brontë as 
revealed through a shared ethos and vocabulary. The opening two lines emphasize this speaker’s 
similar concern with independent choice as essential to the proper management of the soul: “Of 
all the Souls that stand create – / I have Elected – One –.”  The curious notion that a soul is 
selected from among an array of already created souls reads a bit like a riddle that the Brontë 
poem helps to solve once it is understood that the speaker has in mind the courageous souls of 
artists that live on through their creations. That would explain Dickinson’s intriguing use of the 
present tense “create” when the past tense “created” might be expected. For her speaker, the 
work of true artists continues to create because it gathers vital power from the infinite and is not 
exhausted by what her speaker describes as “this brief Drama in the flesh –” (l. 7). Instead, at the 
end of mortal life, “When that which is – and that which was – / Apart – intrinsic – stand –” (ll. 
5-6), the work of art that expresses the poet’s soul will be “shifted – like a Sand –” (l. 8) that in 
an hourglass marks time’s passage but is not subject to its ravages.  
In this instance, Dickinson’s focus on “a Sand” shrinks Brontë’s rock metaphor to the 
nearly microscopic while simultaneously concentrating attention on the selection of a single, 
solitary soul that the speaker points to in line two with the words “I have Elected – One.” This 
image of individuation then shrinks even further, appearing in the penultimate line as “the Atom 
– I preferred –,” echoing Brontë’s atom reference at the end of “No coward soul is mine.” The 
idea that the soul is elemental like the atom and that the atom figuratively expresses the artist’s 
soul that endures beyond this life binds together all parts of the Dickinson poem. Interpreted in 
light of the Brontë poem, Dickinson’s speaker may be understood as selecting her own version of 
Brontë’s undaunted soul, her precursor now functioning as an artistic model whose inspiration 
strengthens her own poetic resolve and enables her to justify the “Subterfuge”11 (l. 4) required to 
avoid the appeal of temporary fame and emerge triumphant when at last all the “Mists – are 
carved away” (l. 10).  In a manner consistent with the advice offered in the poem “Fame is the 
one that does not stay –” (Fr1507), this speaker remains “out of sight of estimate” in order that 
she might “Ascend incessantly –” (1, 3-4). Staying out of sight is, as the Brontë poem makes 
clear and Dickinson here reiterates, neither a safe refuge nor an escape but rather a locus for 
high-risk ventures that advance in the face of doubt.    
 “Fame’s consummate fee” turns out to be the reduction of individuality required to 
submerge the most elemental self in what Michael C. Cohen describes as the distributed network 
of language—a network I am associating with Brontë’s “steadfast rock of immortality,” as well 
as the language theories of Hitchcock, Peabody, and Trench. Cohen puts it this way: “a 
networked Dickinson must be a less singular Dickinson, an author with diminished control over 
the production, propagation, distribution, and dispersal of her own language, even in cases when 
that language is neither printed nor published” (76). This surrender of agency is a matter of 
particular interest to Bruno Latour, who notes in Reassembling the Social, his influential book on 
network theory, that “Action is not done under full control of consciousness” and “should be felt 
as a node, a knot, a conglomerate of many surprising acts of agencies” (44).12 When the actor is a 
poet seeking immortality, the proper aim is to maximize the circulation and duration of the 
network by accepting as inevitable the reduction of individuality exacted by fame as the price of 
reciprocity. This is precisely the process Mary Loeffeloholz sees Dickinson describing in “Of all 
the Souls that stand create –” where, in Loeffelholz’s words, the “elective economy of the 
speaking subject is a network effect of the crowd gathered, as ‘Mists – are carved away’” (116). 
As a consequence, “the human subject is at once an irreducible, unique kernel of autonomy and a 
matheme or node in an infinite ordering network.”  The poet contributes to Hitchcock’s golden 
chain, we might say, by accepting the inevitable refinement and transmutation of her artistic 
soul.         
In his examination of authorial subjectivity in Dickinson’s later poems, Cohen pays 
particular attention to the poem “A little overflowing word” (Fr1501) in which the hyper-copious 
“overflowing word” represents the poet’s distinct contribution—the equivalent of what I have 
described as Dickinson’s and Brontë’s elemental soul—that enters into and becomes a stable 
feature within networked language over which the poet has little control (76). “Though 
Generations pass away” and “Traditions ripen and decay,” the speaker states, this overflowing 
word “As eloquent appears –” (ll. 4-6). Cohen explains that this timeless eloquence derives from 
“communicative excess” (90), by means of which poems deviate from the original circuit of 
authorial intention to become “social entities” that circulate independently (76). “Networked 
language,” he argues, “is alienating language . . . severed from subjectivity . . . only to return as 
the animated incarnation of the communication system” (83). Another way of saying this is that 
the poet who aspires to immortality must risk the release of poems into the communication 
network where they enter new lives independent of the poet’s name and biography.   
 If I am correct in suggesting that Dickinson and Brontë employ the rock metaphor in a 
manner resembling what language theorists like Cohen today refer to as a decentralized linguistic 
network, then Dickinson’s insertion of Brontë’s “No coward soul is mine” in her funeral service 
represents her effort to re-attach Brontë’s name to overflowing words in her own body of work, 
while simultaneously declaring that she joins Brontë in her willingness to risk namelessness as 
the price exacted by literary immortality.  The key point is that both poets recognize that they 
have limited control over poems that take on lives of their own and, paradoxically, state their 
willingness to risk namelessness in a bid for immortality. When Dickinson calls out Brontë’s 
name for the purpose of enhancing her precursor’s fame at the same time that she draws attention 
to her own literary achievement, she does so through a gesture that depends for its defiance on 
recognition of the doubt it refuses.   
 That I have just taken the time to identify examples of Brontë’s influence on Dickinson’s 
work may be viewed as evidence that Dickinson succeeded in drawing attention to the linguistic 
network both poets helped generate. The fact that I have had access to published editions and 
manuscript archives of Dickinson’s writing that have enabled my search for Brontë’s influence 
indicates that Dickinson also succeeded in attaching her name to the body of work now closely 
associated with her biography. This accomplishment may be construed as inhibiting an otherwise 
less constrained, un-named circulation of her work through a decentralized communication 
system and in a sense detaching it from the less differentiated and more enduring network that is 
Brontë’s “steadfast rock of immortality.” Dickinson’s successful assertion of her own name does 
indeed cast the light of celebrity on specific behavior, such as her correspondence with Niles that 
I examined earlier, or any one of a number of dramatic enactments that might include her 
conduct with Higginson when he first visited her in 1870, the role she cast for herself in Amherst 
as the elusive recluse Mabel Loomis Todd described as “the Myth,” and her posthumous 
orchestration of her funeral. The question I now ask myself is whether or not her success at 
naming her work retroactively re-defines the enigmatic gestures of her private life as the staged 
performances of a celebrity. All I can say at the moment is that it seems like it does. 
    My final point is that Dickinson’s efforts at self-attribution were not designed to exert 
anything like absolute control over her writing; her inclusion of Brontë in her funeral is one of 
many steps she took to communicate this important point. It is significant that the full scope of 
her literary production did not reach the broad reading public until after her death; that is, after 
she had surrendered control over it. By making clear her collaboration with Brontë, Dickinson in 
effect unsettled her own sovereign authority by asserting the networked rather than the unitary 
nature of her art.  Dickinson may in this sense be only partially guilty of, in Cohen’s words, 
“reattaching identities to messages and thereby assigning responsibility or blame to actors, who 
are often represented subsequently as having hijacked the system for their own purposes” (76).  
Dickinson did call attention to poems that would become associated with her name, but she also 
left what must continue to be considered a remarkably unruly and highly controversial body of 
work that has fascinated editors and critics to the extent that we still debate how to break the 
Dickinson poetic line, how to interpret her variants, what the fascicles are and how to read them, 
the importance of her circulation of poems in letters, and whether or not her letters violate the 
limits of genre, to name only a few of the quandaries related to her writing that may never be 
resolved. These and other questions like them, demonstrate that we are still trying to figure out 
what a Dickinson poem is, reiterating through our efforts the instability of form, meaning, and 






                                                 
Notes 
 
1 Genevieve Taggard states that Dickinson let “Vinnie know she wished Mr. Higginson to read 
[‘No coward soul is mine’] at her grave when she died” (236); Michael Moon cites Taggard 
when he describes Dickinson’s wish to have the Brontë poem read by Thomas Wentworth 
Higginson as an “immediate sign of Dickinson’s awareness of the powerful transferal of energy 
between Brontë’s writing and her own” (231); in Last Things: Emily Brontë’s Poems, Janet 
Gezari also observes that “Emily Dickinson asked to have ‘No coward soul is mine’ read at her 
funeral” (128). Despite this seeming consensus of opinion, however, not all scholars cite 
Dickinson’s deliberate request as part of the directions she gave for her funeral. Barton Levi St. 
Armand, for instance, treats Higginson’s reading of the poem as integral to Dickinson’s final 
artistic gesture that he views as “Dickinson’s last poem” (74), but he does not definitively 
declare that the poem was read at her request. Instead, he presents Higginson’s reading as 
consistent with the overall design of the funeral as dictated by Dickinson (73-77). Richard B. 
Sewall merely notes that Higginson read “No coward soul is mine” at the funeral (575, 667) and 
Alfred Habegger follows suit, adding that “the defiant poem . . . had been a favorite with 
[Dickinson]” (627). The most complete discussion of the funeral appears in Aífe Murray’s Maid 
as Muse: How Servants Changed Emily Dickinson’s Life and Language. In the chapter titled 
“Emily Dickinson’s Irish Wake,” Murray points out that Sewall depended on Jay Leyda’s 
research for his own account of the funeral and when  pressed to state definitively whether 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dickinson’s instructions were “written or verbal,” Sewall “replied, ‘Wish I could tell you more. I 
can’t. All I know is what’s in Leyda. He should have listed a source’” (189). 
2 Susan Howe has previously argued in support of the shared artistic purpose that I see as further 
supported by Dickinson’s funeral. “Out of Brontë’s Self,” Howe writes, “out of her Myth, the 
younger woman chose to pull her purity of purpose. Metamorphosis of thought into the 
corresponding vocation” (61). 
3 Vivian R. Pollak provides useful insight into what she describes as Dickinson’s “conflicted” 
relationship with literary fame in the “Dickinson’s Personal Publics” chapter of Our Emily 
Dickinsons: American Women Writers and the Intimacies of Difference. There she writes, 
“However emphatic her denials of ambition, she was deeply conflicted about her private 
vocation and longing to be remembered” (70). The argument I make here presents Dickinson’s 
denials as paradoxically essential to her pursuit of fame. 
4 Richard B. Sewall cites Clara Newman Turner’s account of Dickinson’s funeral in which she 
describes the central service despite having been too ill to attend personally: “’The service was 
very simple. The Pastor of the Congregational Church of Amherst read from the Scriptures. Rev. 
Mr. Jenkins of Portland led in prayer, and Col. Higginson followed with the reading of Emily 
Brontë’s last Poem. . .’” (273-74). Higginson’s reading concludes the service, after which the 
coffin is transported to the grave. 
5 Katherine Frank reads these lines as Brontë’s “unequivocal repudiation of orthodox religion . . . 
and her celebration of her own individual faith which she affirmed armed her against fear and 
doubt and made a mockery of death” (217). Gezari more directly affirms the pantheistic 
character of Brontë’s opposition to orthodoxy: “she expresses faith in an infinite, enduring life 
                                                                                                                                                             
pervading the universe and in the soul brave enough to claim its participation in that life” (Things 
134).  
6 Steve Vine has noted that this part of the poem “perversely conflates categories that, from an 
orthodox perspective, should be rigorously distinguished” (47). Vine touches on the issue of 
reciprocity in the following: “the syntactical fluidity of the lines fleetingly identifies the ‘I’ with 
‘Undying Life,’ mingling the two instead of separating them” (47).  
7 Charlotte Brontë’s editing of “No coward soul is mine” testifies to Emily’s violation of even 
the norms established among the sisters. Gezari points out how Charlotte sought to diminish 
Emily’s declaration that “human beings . . . carry the whole of the known and unknown world—
every existence—within them” by altering the poem so that it more clearly situates the infinite 
exclusively within the divine (135). My own analysis of the poem presumes that Charlotte’s 
efforts failed, at least in Dickinson’s case. For a complete discussion of Charlotte’s editorial 
revisions see 128-134 in Gezari’s Last Things. My reading of the Brontë poem more closely 
resembles Michael Moon’s when he proposes that the poem be considered “as a writer’s 
rededication of herself to the muse of writing-for-herself (or for the muse and for herself?) rather 
than writing for other readers” (240). Commenting directly on Dickinson’s reading of Emily 
Brontë and the argument Moon advances, Amelia Greene arrives at the following conclusion: 
“’No coward soul’ seems a declaration of both the preservation of the spirit after death and the 
preservation of poetic intent despite critical antagonism or hostility, an interpretation that may 
link Dickinson with the earlier poet outside the framework of religious belief” (123). 
8 Margaret Homans offers a divergent view of the artist’s agency when she argues that even in 
the unedited version of the poem any perception of mutual dependence between speaker and 
divine is belied by “a hierarchical devotion that operates only in one direction” (132). What is 
                                                                                                                                                             
most interesting about Homans’s position is that she sees the speaker of the poem defining 
herself in competition with the divine.  Drawing on Homans, Mary Loeffelholz concludes that in 
“No coward soul” “Brontë protests too much that the immortal power really does reside within 
the poet’s own breast” (156). Gezari strikes a contrary posture, arguing that while Brontë “may 
not announce her arrival in a safe port,” the poem does locate “a rock on which hope anchors” 
(130). By this means, Gezari concludes, Brontë “manages to hold eternity firmly in view and to 
persuade herself that her own creative power is indomitable.”  Different as these scholarly 
assessments are, they agree that a key question posed by the poem turns on whether or not the 
poet/speaker is capable of achieving immortality through her own creative efforts. The boldness 
of her ambition,which is matched only by her confrontation with resistance—the competition or 
protest mentioned by Homans and Loeffelholz —might well have interested Dickinson more 
than any final resolution of the question. 
9 Additional justification for Dickinson’s inclusion of “No coward soul is mine” as part of her 
funeral may be found in the description Charlotte Brontë provides of her sister in the 
“Biographical Notice of Ellis and Acton Bell” that serves as a preface to the 1850 edition of 
Emily’s poems that Dickinson read. Dickinson would certainly have sympathized with the other 
Emily’s initial resistance to her sister’s determination to publish her poems. Charlotte dedicates 
the following paragraph to explaining how her sister responded to the knowledge that Charlotte 
not only discovered and read her poems but sought to have them printed: “My sister Emily was 
not a person of demonstrable character, nor one, on the recesses of whose mind and feelings, 
even those nearest and dearest her could, with impunity, intrude unlicensed; it took hours to 
reconcile her to the discovery I made, and days to persuade her that such poems merited 
publication. I knew, however, that a mind could not be without some latent spark of honourable 
                                                                                                                                                             
ambition, and refused to be discouraged in my attempts to fan that spark to flame” (Charlotte 
Brontë 6).  
10 Dickinson wrote three letters from 1883 and 1884 that include quotes from “No coward soul” 
(L802-803, 843-44, 847-48), all of which draw on the penultimate stanza, not the last one where 
the atom reference appears. The lines are “Though earth and man were gone, / And suns and 
universes ceased to be, / And Thou were left alone, / Every existence would exist in Thee” (221). 
In each letter, Dickinson incorporates Brontë’s words to communicate her own conviction that 
some portion of the self persists beyond the termination of mortal existence. Such a reading is 
consistent with Charles Algernon Swinburne’s 1883 observation that “’Belief in the personal or 
positive immortality of the individual and indivisible spirit was not apparently, in [Emily 
Brontë’s] case, swallowed up or nullified or made nebulous by any doctrine or dream of simple 
reabsorption into some indefinite infinity of eternal life’” (qtd. in Gezari 129). Moon presents 
Dickinson as seizing on the comfort implicit in Swinburne’s reading when she offers her 
correspondents “a single entity who can sustain them all within its existence” while 
simultaneously “de-romanticiz[ing]” the “egotistical-sublime” by casting doubt on the 
individual’s power to shape or control their immortal existence (238). Accordingly, Dickinson 
may have chosen not to focus on Brontë’s atom reference for fear that doing so would have 
provoked even greater uncertainty when her primary aim was to provide comfort. The atom 
reference, though, is important precisely because—as I demonstrate elsewhere in this essay—
Brontë and Dickinson place it in the culminating stanzas of poems acknowledging that the 
magnitude is less important than the quality of what survives. Dickinson would have seen how 
Brontë’s emphasis on courage in her opening line anticipates the possibility that whatever 
individual imprint endures could elude detection. Courage of this kind requires seeing the atom 
                                                                                                                                                             
not as diminutive but rather as constitutive; that is, as the courage to believe that the creative 
process out of which poetry arises is itself anchored in eternity, yielding art that is already part of 
what persists. As a consequence, the best assurance of fame is confidence in the creative 
experience itself. Moon is for this reason convincing when he writes that “what is being 
addressed in ‘No coward soul is mine’” is the “writer’s rededication of herself to the muse of 
writing-for-herself . . .  rather than writing for other readers” (240). Dickinson would have 
appreciated the implied conundrum that the best way to produce enduring work is by not writing 
for future readers. 
11 The Dickinson family edition of Webster’s dictionary defines the word “subterfuge” in a 
manner appropriate to Dickinson’s use of the word in conjunction with the poet’s efforts to 
escape scrutiny while remaining devoted to unconventional art: “Literally, that to which a person 
resorts for escape or concealment; hence, a shift; an evasion; an artifice employed to escape 
censure or the force of an argument, or to justify opinions or conduct.”   
11 In an earlier essay addressing the relationship between actors and networks, Latour elaborates 
on the interdependent and mutually constituent nature of the two: “’Actor’ here is not to play the 
role of agency and ‘network’ to play the role of society. Actor and network . . . designate two 
faces of the same phenomenon, like waves and particles. . .” (“On Recalling” 18-19). When 
Latour states in Reassembling the Social that “a good text” is one that maximizes actors who 
perform as mediators within a network (128), he means that texts are qualitatively superior 
according to their ability to attract actors who contribute to the social life of the subject or word 
that attracts interest; such works “trace a network” by means of the active engagement of actors 
who reshape or translate the network even as they are translated by it. For Latour, a vibrant 
network is one in which all the actors do something and don’t just sit there” (128). Sianne Ngai 
                                                                                                                                                             
explains that such effective texts qualify as “interesting” by virtue of their ability to “link 
heterogeneous agents or agencies together” (114), facilitating “relays, conduits, associations—
that in turn facilitate the circulation of ideas, objects, and signs” (115).  What this means is that 
interesting texts are those that connect active agents who contribute to a dynamic understanding 
of the subject in a manner I am attaching to the subject of fame as advanced by Dickinson 
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